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THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

C O M M E N T A R Y

Why Did No One See this Coming? How Did
It Happen? The 2016 Presidential Election
by L. Sandy Maisel

T

he 2016 presidential election was
humbling for everyone—except for
Donald J. Trump. Nearly everyone had
it wrong. Most pollsters had it wrong.
The pundits had it wrong. The media
had it wrong. Hillary Clinton’s vaunted
analytical team had it wrong. Donald
Trump’s advisors had it wrong. No one—
except for Donald Trump—thought
that Donald Trump would emerge early
in the morning of November 9 as president-elect.1
In this commentary, I will explore
why Donald Trump won, why so few
analysts predicted that victory, and what
the Trump presidency might mean for
policy in the years ahead. But I start with
a caveat. I was one of those people who
had it wrong. I underestimated Donald
Trump during the Republican primaries.
I underestimated him in the general
election. I did not see his appeal. I think
I know why—but—caveat lector.
HOW DID EVERYONE
GET IT WRONG?

T

he nation’s pollsters are all reassessing their craft. For some time,
pollsters have been concerned about
nonresponse rates. Who answers pollsters’ questions? Who does not? Are
the two groups systematically different?
Pollsters know that response rates are
different on telephone polls that are
directly dialed from those on robo
calls. They know that internet polls
have well-understood strengths and
weaknesses. Pollsters have not missed
election predictions this badly in the
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era of modern, scientific polling, so the
profession is concerned about whether
their respondents represent the electorate accurately.
Part of that concern deals with how
they weight their samples. Every pollster
knows that, given those who answer
their questions, they still must judge
who will vote and who will not. They ask
filtering questions, to be sure, but they
also make assumptions about the final
turnout. Donald Trump objected to
these assumptions when he questioned
pollsters’ choosing which respondents to
count. He may have been right.
At one point during the campaign
Nate Cohn of the New York Times gave
the raw data from a Times poll to four
reputable professional pollsters, asking
them to interpret the results. The pollsters’ predictions based on the same data
differed, and they differed by more than
a percentage point or two. The difference was in assumptions about how
many African Americans, Latinos, or
women, for example, would turn out to
vote. Cohn and other poll aggregators
made their judgments based on examining all the polls (and their own opinions of the quality of individual polls).
They were concerned because of the
variation in the polls, variation based on
differing assumptions about turnout.
Near the end, however, the polls came
together, and that gave everyone confidence.
Wrong. The coalescence of the polls
may well have been due to groupthink.
Pollsters found a common ground, none
wanting to be too far away from the



average, but, in fact, they were all off. To
be sure, they were within the margin of
error of the national popular vote. But
we elect our president on the basis of
electoral votes won in the states. Pollsters
were far off in key states because they all
misjudged the turnout among working
class white males who took their anger
and frustration with governmental policies and turned them into votes for the
outsider, Donald Trump.
Groupthink, the need for conformity with a group’s consensus that can
lead to irrational decisions, has long
been a problem in politics (as in other
fields). In 2016, the malady reached new
proportions. Pollsters may have
succumbed to it. Journalists and pundits
almost certainly succumbed to it. The
Clinton victory seemed inevitable, so it
must be inevitable. The pollsters said so,
and thus the aggregators said so. Even
though Nate Silver of 538 said that there
was a 30 percent chance of a Trump
victory, that still meant that Hillary was
a two to one favorite to win; Upshot had
her odds at 84 percent; Huffpollster at
98 percent. Who wouldn’t bet on those
odds? And if the aggregators had her that
likely to win, why should the media
question that conclusion?
Media groupthink was exacerbated
by groupthink among the electorate.
Those who favored Secretary Clinton,
who thought Mr. Trump did not have
the qualifications to be president, who
were repulsed by what they saw as divisive appeals during his campaign talked
only to those who agreed with their
views. They did not know the people
who were flocking to the Trump rallies.
They did not read the same newspapers,
watch the same television news (or television shows), or go to the same movies.
They lived in another reality—and
nothing in their world told them to reassess what they believed. That is classic
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groupthink—stereotyping the opposition as inferior and not reassessing
assumptions—and it led to so many of
us being wrong.
So on Tuesday, November 8, we
waited for the inevitable—for the first
woman to be elected president—except
for Donald Trump who heard a different
beat.
WHY DID TRUMP WIN?

N

ow we get to the blame game. At
least for the Clinton camp.
Here is what we know. First, Hillary
Clinton did not hold the Obama coalition together strongly enough. African
Americans supported her, but by 5
percentage points less (88 percent as
opposed to 93 percent) than they had
President Obama. In addition, fewer
African Americans turned out, especially
in urban centers of the Rust Belt. No
surprise really. President Obama was the
first African American candidate with a
major party nomination for president;
while he and the First Lady Michelle
Obama passionately urged their backers
to support his chosen successor, Clinton
was not Obama. Similarly, Latinos
supported Clinton in about the same
percentage as they had Obama—and
their turnout was about the same. But
these numbers also did not meet expectations. Given candidate Trump’s rhetoric
and the growth in the Latino population,
the thought was that Clinton would win
a higher percentage of these voters, and
the absolute number, in places like
Florida, would be higher. Wrong again.
Second, college-educated women
did not turn out to vote for Hillary
Clinton in the numbers that had been
anticipated. In fact, she won the women’s
vote by only 1 percent more than
Obama had four years earlier, hardly a
resounding win over a candidate dubbed
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misogynistic. Why was this the case?
Most of us refused to face the fact that
Hillary Clinton was a very unpopular
candidate. In early polling, college-educated women were supporting her over
Donald Trump, not because they were
ardent Clinton supporters, but because
they deemed him worse. We heard
repeatedly that these were the two least
popular candidates ever to run against
each other for president. We knew that
some people liked Trump, some liked
Clinton, and many liked neither. We did
not hear much about how those who
disliked both were making their decisions. The assumption was that women
(and Latinos) would vote for Clinton—
and that Trump could not overcome
those losses.
Why did this result not eventuate?
Two reasons. First, Secretary Clinton
came to this campaign with baggage,
and she never dealt with it. The email
scandal never went away. The sense that
she felt she should be treated differently
never went away. Her campaign was
blind to the optics of the Goldman
Sachs speeches, of Bill Clinton’s airport
visit with Attorney General Lynch, of
how much she was viewed as part of the
establishment elite that placed itself
above every day citizens. Second, I
believe that FBI Director James Comey’s
October surprise—his announcement
nine days before the election that the
FBI was looking into emails found on
Clinton aide Huma Abedin’s computer—
reminded many of the women on whom
Clinton was counting about all of these
factors, about what they disliked about
her. And these college-educated,
suburban voters returned to their normal
preference, voting for the Republican
they did not like more than the
Democrat they did not like. To be sure,
Clinton still won among these voters,
but not by as much as was predicted.



Third, working-class white males
(an inexact term used to describe male
voters in the exurbs of Midwestern cities)
voted in higher numbers and against the
Democrat in higher numbers than
anyone predicted. Why? I think the
reasons are complex. We cannot ignore a
certain amount of basic sexism. It is hard
to deny that Secretary Clinton was
treated differently as a candidate because
she is a woman. For some, the historic
nature of her candidacy was a plus. But
clearly for some, maybe especially those
who work in a male-dominated environment and who have not been used to
women in positions of authority, her
gender was a problem—and they
responded to questions about her
stamina, her health, her ability to lead in
a forceful way.
More specifically, these are citizens
who have not benefited from globalization, whose jobs were put in jeopardy by
NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) (which they associate with
Clinton), but most importantly, who
did not feel that the Democratic Party or
Secretary Clinton cared about them. The
Democratic Party took them for granted,
and Donald Trump did not. Party
leaders assumed that these voters knew
that the Democrats were the party of
working people, but the voters’ experiences were different. Donald Trump
campaigned in their small towns and
neighborhoods. Secretary Clinton and
the news media flew right over them,
never stopping to hear what they were
thinking. Worst of all, Secretary Clinton
lumped them with extremist Trump
supporters as “deplorables.” In these
voters’ minds, they are not deplorable;
they are hardworking people trying to
make ends meet in a difficult time who
saw the party they had supported ignore
them. If an inclusive Democratic Party
ignored them, they were willing to be
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excluded. Bernie Sanders understood
this feeling of dissatisfaction during the
primary season, but the Clinton
campaign never crafted a message that
included those who were suffering
economically as well as those who
suffered because of years of systemic
exclusion.
We also know that Secretary Clinton
won the popular vote by nearly 2.9
million votes. Wow! More than many
Electoral College winners, including
John Kennedy. But we also know that
she won California and New York by a
combined 5 million votes—and lost the
rest of the country by about 2.1 million.
If nothing else, that should tell us something about how different those two
states—the headquarters of every major
media outlet in the nation—are from
the rest of the country. When one adds
that Secretary Clinton won over 92
percent of the vote in the District of
Columbia, the division becomes clearer.
For citizens living in a wide swath of the
country, Secretary Clinton was a very
bad candidate, the wrong person for the
wrong time.
WHAT DOES THIS ELECTION
MEAN FOR THE FUTURE?

R

emember, reader beware! Many
ardent liberals feel that the end is
near. Everything that they have fought
for—rights for minorities, peace, or the
environment, for example—is lost. They
are protesting (“Not my president”),
signing petitions, and bemoaning every
signal (for example, the appointment of
Steve Bannon as chief strategist) that the
Trump presidency will be as bad as they
anticipated.
I understand those feelings and
share many of them. To be sure, the
years ahead will be ones in which we
who share those feelings must look out
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for each other, speak clearly when rights
are being violated, and continue to fight
battles we have fought for many years.
But in American politics, battles that
have been won must always be re-won,
no victory is forever, and vigilance is
always needed.
I also am the ultimate believer in
the American system of government. For
the last eight years, liberals have been
restrained and have had to accept partial
victories because the system favors
moving slowly and gives those who favor
the status quo many opportunities to
oppose change. Now those seeking to
roll back the progress on civil rights,
LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) rights, the environment, and other issues will be thwarted
in their efforts. That is not a positive sign
for liberals, but it signals a strategy
moving forward. As President Obama
said after his initial meeting in the Oval
Office with President-elect Trump,
Donald Trump is a pragmatist, not an
ideologue. To be sure, his rhetoric flamed
the worst passions of ideologues of the
far right, and I think we have a legitimate concern about the image of
America portrayed in off-the-cuff
comments by our elected president. But
that does not mean all of his supporters
share those views—they do not—nor
does it mean that he will govern from
that perspective. In the years ahead, the
job of those who opposed his candidacy
is to support him when he moves to the
center and oppose him when he leans in
the direction of those supporters. The
system is designed to help in that strategy.
Finally, we must learn the right
lessons from this campaign. In my mind,
the key lesson is to listen to voters
throughout the nation, to understand
the impact of economic inequality on
voters everywhere in America, and to
find common ground where we are now



divided. To me, patriots are those who
believe in American progress and the
American promise for all people, not just
those with whom we are immediately
concerned. Defining greatness in those
inclusive terms, not in retrogressive,
divisive terms, is the challenge of the
coming years. ENDNOTES
1

To be fair, political scientists who based
their predictions on factors known
before the two parties’ nominations—
and who did not change their prediction—foresaw a Republican win. Also
American University historian Allan
Lichtman made his ninth straight accurate prediction based on 13 true/false
questions answered months before
the election. See https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix
/wp/2016/10/28/professor-whos
-predicted-30-years-of-presidential
-elections-correctly-is-doubling
-down-on-a-trump-win/?utm
_term=.5ed2b92263b9
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